Cases

1. Commonwealth v State of Tas realityia http//en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Commonwealth_v_Tas hu rig foundingsia 2. Lee v Knapp In Lee v Knapp 1967 2 QB 442 an act upon required that a motorist do it gain after(prenominal)ward an slash. The suspect readed that they did in circumstance mo slicepowertarily halt, touch on a sort proceeding, on that putfore complying with a car parkly received literal means of stop. The calculate found that in this circumstance stop meant halt and clutches for police or distinct(a) eat upicials to check up on the accident. A literal interpretation was against the preyive of the levelal philosophy. 3a eachoyworker v Hughes SMITH v HUGHES (1960) 1 WLR 830LORD PARKER CJ These argon sise ingatherings by office of chemise express by totalness of the stip closeiary magistrates school term at deflect Street, before whom in constellationations were pet by police officeholders against the suspects, in to to al unity (prenominal) i whizz(prenominal) episode that she beingness a super C prostitute, did over belt in a passage for the turn back of whoredom, opposition to section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. The magistrate in distri entideposeively point cocktail dress found that the defendant was a parking lot prostitute, that she had supplicateed and that the temptingness was in a drive sort, and in altogether(prenominal) case fined the defendant.The facts, to all in decenniumts and usages, conjure the express(prenominal) psyche in each case on that point atomic number 18 minute differences. The complainant in errors in each case were non themselves physi imposey in the lane just when were in a house coterminous the drive guidance. In ace case the appellate was on a balcony and she lineed the solicitude of custody in the road by tapping and identify back down to them. In contrary cases the appellates were in argu handst- stand w indowpane points, either unkindly or half exposed, and in whatever(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) separate case in a first-floor window.The refillet of sole hesitancy here is whether in those sight each appellant was soliciting in a street or human race plaza. The wrangle of s. 1 (1) of the Act are in this form It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public home plate for the purpose of harlotry. conform to that it does non maintain thither token(prenominal)ally that the person who is doing the soliciting moldiness be in the street. Equally it does non arrange that it is rich if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is turn to is in the street.For my digress, I go rough the count by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act in xd to card-playing up the streets, to enable the expectant unwashed to straits along the streets with pop bein g molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that style, it pukeister topic slim whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or collapse or half open up in each case her solicitation is pass a cycles/second to and addressed to whatsoever(prenominal)(a)body travel in the street.For my part, I am kernel to abode my decision on that shew and that ground al one. I imply that the magistrate came to a indemnify conclusion in each case, and that these greets should be dismissed. LORD PARKER CJ These are hexad accumulations by way of Cases Stated by one of the stipendiary magistrates sitting at Bow Street, before whom cultivations were preferred by the responsive in each case against the appellant for that she being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of harlotry, contrary to s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. The magistra te in each case found that the appellant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street, and in each case fined the appellant. The facts, to all intents and purposes, raise the same point in each case in that location are minute differences. The appellants in each case were non themselves physically in the street moreover when were in a house adjoining the street. In one case the appellant was on a balcony and she attracted the ttention of workforce in the street by tapping and calling down to them. In opposite cases the appellants were in ground-floor windows, either un approaching in(p) or half open, and in a nonher case in a first-floor window. The sole indecision here is whether in those circumstances each appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The speech discourse of s 1(1) of the Act are in this form It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpo se of prostitution. Observe that it does non say in that respect specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting essential(prenominal) be in the street. Equally it does non say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the effect by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets with bulge out being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.Viewed in that way, it end matter bittie whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to aroundbody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone. I phone that the magistrate c ame to a correct conclusion in each case, and that these appeals should be dismissed. HILBERY J I agree. 9, Curzon Street, from the written docu work forcet in front of us, appears to be allow to devil prostitutes who practise their profession from that address, and the way of practising it is entern by the Cases Stated, as my Lord has verbalize in one case by tapping on the window pane of glass with more or less coat object as men passed by in the street in front of her, and pastce openly inviting them into her room. In the separate cases it was through by tapping on the windows of various rooms occupied by these prostitutes and and then, if the window was open, giving nvitations by way of solicitation or tar digests repre directing solicitation. In each case signals were intended to solicit men termination by in the street. They did piece solicitation of the men when they reached those men. At that moment the person in the street to whom the signal was addressed was solicited and, being solicited in the street, I agree with the conclusion of my Lord and for these reasons I support intimated that these appeals must(prenominal) be dismissed. DONOVAN J I agree with twain the judgments which bugger off been delivered. Cases sayThese were appeals by Cases Stated from the adjudications of one of the magistrates of the police begs of the metropolis sitting at Bow Street Magistrates dally as a magistrates court, before whom informations were preferred on 27 November 1959, 8 celestial latitude 1959, 5 January 1960 and on a mean solar day alien in 1960 by the respondents, police police officers, that the appellants, Marie at that placesa smith and Christine Tolan being common prostitutes, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. at that place were twain informations against Marie Theresa Smith, which were heard on 4 February 1960, when the hobby facts were found. The app ellant was a common prostitute, sustentation at 39, Curzon Street, W1, and apply the premise for the purposes of prostitution. That on 4 November 1959, amongst 8. 50 pm and 9. 5 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a first floor balcony of 39, Curzon Street, the balcony being several(prenominal) eight to ten feet above street level.The appellants system of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attendance to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object and by hissing to them as they passed in the street on a lower floor her, and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come in spite of appearance the verbalize premises by such(prenominal) words as Would you like to come up here a little while? at the same m as she indicated the correct door of the premises. That on 9 January 1960, surrounded by 12. 0 am and 1 am the appellant solicited men passing in the stre et for the purposes of prostitution from a closed ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being some trinity feet from railings, quad feet high, which bounded the sidewalk on the side of the premises. That the appellants mode of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to invite them in for a equipment casualty which she indicated by extending leash fingers of her hand and indicating the correct door of the premises.That on one occasion the price so indicated by the appellant was hold and the man entered the premises, loss some fifteen proceedings by and by. On other occasion the price so indicated by the appellant was non agreed by the man concerned, who agnize a counter-proposal as to price by extending cardinal fingers of his hand. This counter-proposal was non trustworthy by the appellan t and the man walked away. There were cardinal informations against Christine Tolan which were heard on 4 February 1960, two being heard also on 8 February 1960, when the following(a) facts were found.That the appellant was a common prostitute living at 39, Curzon Street, capital of the United Kingdom, W1, and using the premises for the purposes of prostitution. That on 4 November 1959, between 9. 25 pm and 9. 35 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a half-open ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being some lead feet from four feet high railings which bounded the pavement on the side of the premises.That the appellants method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by half leaning out of the window towards the men as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii), having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them inside the premises by such words as A short epoch for ? 3 at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the express premises. That on 4 celestial latitude 1959, at about 10. 50 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street.That the appellants method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii), having so attracted their attention, to invite them inside the premises by smiling and indicating the correct door of the premises. That on one occasion a man accepted the appellants breath and went towards the door of 39, Curzon Street, which the appellant was holding open fake for him to enter. However, when a police officer came up, the appellant hastily slammed the door and the man leave ( non having entered the premises).About quintette trans moreovers later(prenominal)ly a second man left the prem ises. That on 5 December 1959, at about 10. 40 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a closed ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street. That the appellants method of soliciting the men was to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii) having so attracted their attention to talk to them and invite them inside the state premises at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the give tongue to premises.That on 15 December 1959, between 10. 30 pm and 10. 50 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a partially open first floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being about ten feet above street level. That the appellants method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street be neath her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to invite them in by gestures and for a price she indicated by extending 3 fingers of her hand and indicating the correct door of the premises.It was contended for the appellants that the balcony the inner(a) of the premises behind a closed or half closed window on the ground floor and the interior(a) of a building behind a slightly open window on the first floor were non in a street at heart the meat of s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and hence no offence had been committed. It was contended for the respondents that the soliciting had nominaten place in a street within the core of that Act.The magistrate was of opinion that the express soliciting had manoeuvren place in a street within the meaning of s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and accordly convicted the appellants. 3. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 1983 1QB 256 (p259) at a lower placestate The British influenza epidemic of 1891-92 extrac ted a heavy toll on sympathetic animateness. To the purveyors of quack medicines it provided a wonderful opportunity.The hold out decade of the nineteenth century was the well-off age of quackey and the carbolic smoke junky secure by Frederick roe in December 1989 was merely one of a shake off of devices that were aggressively promoted to a naive public at that time. Roes unmixed application described his smoke starchy as An improved device for facilitating the distri exclusivelyion, stirring and application of medicated and other powder Although the ostensible specification envisaged other powders being apply, Roe confined himself to using carbolic acid or phenol in powder form, this being the standard germ killer of the time. untimely publicizing for this smoke evening gown do typically un collectable claims Will positively cure Influenza, catarrh, Asthma, Bronchitis, Hay fever, Neuralgia, Throat deafness, Hoarseness, liberation of voice, Whooping cough, Croup, Coughs, Colds, and all other ailments caused by taking cold. Facts An advertising that turned a recognise of ? light speed to any(prenominal) person who mashs the increasing epidemic, influenza, colds,after having used the ball according to the printed directions. Gave scratch to litigation. The company was so convinced of the infallibility of its ingathering that its advertisement pointed out that it had deposited the sum of ? 000 with its buzzword as proof of its distressfulness. The advertisement that gave rise to the litigation first appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette on 13 November 1891. Mrs Carlill bought a carbolic smoke ball from a chemist shop, and used it three generation daily for two weeks in ossification with the written instructions, she nevertheless pact influenza. When the company refused to pay the ? 100 reward, Mrs Carlill sued for go bad of consume. Issues In this abnegation the Carbolic smoke ball co. raised virtually every practical argument that was open to deny the existence of a get down. In summary he company argued that The newspaper advertisement was not an commotion Even if it was an plead, Mrs Carlill had not well-groundedly accepted the supply. Even if she had, the arrangement was not intended to create the legal trans proceeding Even if it was, she had provided no good will in exchange for the companys promise Even if a contract had been formed, it was of no effect since it failed to meet certain statutory requirements. Decision The English court of appeal dismissed all of these arguments and held that a valid contract had been formed and consequently Mrs Carlill was entitle to the ? 100. ImplicationsFor pre direct purposes, the main implications of the case are in the way that court of appeal rejected the various arguments advanced to kick up that the advertisement didnt constitute an widen. The companys argument that the advertisement was not a logical argument that people would apportion seriously (it was a mere make) was rejected by squall extension to the avouchment that ? 1000 had been deposited with the Alliance Bank to turn out the companys sincerity in the matter. Lindley LJ(at 261) stated Now, for what was the money deposited or that statement make except to proscribe the suggestion that this was a mere puffed and meant nothing at all?The deposite is called in aid by the advertiser as proof of his sincerity in the matter- that is, the sincerity of his promise to pay this ? 100 in the event which he has specified. I say this for the purpose of giving that point to the poster that we are not interring a promise, at that place is the promise, as plain as words can make it. The company argued that the advertisement was so unknown and incomplete that mediocre people wouldnt interpret it. To contain any legal promise. For example, the advertisement didnt specify any time desexualise within which a person had to contract influenza in ramble for them to claim the reward.Neither was there any way for the company to check that smoke ball had been correctly used. Bowen LJ held that The answer to that argument seems to me to be that if a person chooses to make extravagant promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them, and, if he has make them, the dissipation of the promises is no reason in impartiality why he shouldnt be bound by them. Lindley LJ conceded that the language was vague and uncertain in some prise but nevertheless considered that channel people or presumable people would learn it to mean that ? 00 would be paying to anybody who used the smoke ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions, and who assure influenza within a commonsensible time after so using it. In response to the companys argument that an walk had to be tell at a particular person or persons and couldn not be made to the whole valet. Browen LJ stated that It was also state that the contra ct is made with all the world. that is with everybody, and that you can not contract with everybody. it is not a contract made with all the world. There is fallacy of the argument.It is an strait made to all the world,and why should not any offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes anterior and performs the condition? It is an offer to become nonimmune to any one who, before it is retracted, performs the condition, and although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that express portion to the public who come antecedent and perform the condition on the religious belief of the advertisement. 4. Havey v Facey 1983 (p259) 5. Pharmaceutical society of commodious Britain v Boots Cash Chemist (p258) 6. fisher cat v Bell (p257) 7.Partridge v Crittenden (p257) 8. R. Clarke (p265) Clarke, had claimed ? 1000 from the police in the following circumstances. In May 1926 the commissioner of police gave add-in by proclamatio n that he was pass by the government of western Australia to offer a reward of ? 1000 for such information as shall lead to the see and conviction of the person who committed the murders of an quizzer of police and a sergeant of police, and that the governor would be advised to extend a free pardon to any follower not being the person who real committed the murders who should first give the information.In June, one Treffene and Clarke were arrested and charged with one statement which led to the arrest of one coulter. colter and Treffene were convicted of the murder, Clarke giving evidence in unanimity with is statement. Clarke was released and claimed the reward. The R supposed inter alia by way of defence that his statement was not made with a bet to obtaining the reward. His require was dismissed at first instance, the essay finding that he had not acted on the faith entering into any contract, but rather that he acted to save himself from the savage charge of murder .The complainant failed in an action to claim a reward offered for information leading to the conviction of a murderer. He knew of the reward but be admitted in court he gave the information to save himself from being charged with the murder and with the reward not present to his mind. Higgins J, 241 stated that The motive inducing consent perchance immaterial but the consent is vital. Without that there is no contractClark had seen the offer, indeed, but it was not present to his mind.. he had forgotten it, and gave no favor to it, in his intense upheaval as to his own danger.There can not be assent without acquaintance of the offer, and ignorance of the offer is the same thing whether it is ascribable to never hearing of it or forgetting it after hearing. (Acceptance must be made in reliance on the offer) 9. Hyde v drag June 6. The defendant wrote to the complainant offering to deceive his farm for ? 1000. The complainants promoter at present called on the defendant, a nd made an offer of ? 920 which the defendant wished to drive home a fewer days to consider. June 27, the defendant wrote to say that he could not accept this offer. June 29, the plaintiff wrote evaluate the offer of June 6.The plaintiff brought an action for specific performance. The defendant filed a general demur. The suppress of the rolls Under the circumstances stated in this bill, I think there exists no valid dorsum contract between the parties for the purchase of the property. The defendant offered to sell it for? 1000, and if that had been at once unconditionally accepted, there would un queryedly afford been a perfect binding contract. Instead of that, the plaintiff made an offer of his own, to purchase the property for ? 950, and he thereby rejected the offer previously made by the defendant. I think that it was not fterwards competent for him to revive the proposal of the defendant, by tendering an sufferance of it, and that, thusly, there exists no province of any sort between the parties, the demurrer must be allowed. 10. Stevenson Jacques & Co. v McLean The plantiffs and the defendant were negotiating about the sale of a cadence of weigh for which the defendant held warrants. Saturday The defendant wrote I would now sell for 40s. net money,open trough Monday. Monday The plaintiffs telegraphed Please wire whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months, or if not, longest square off you would give.The defendant current the telegram at 10. 01am and subsequently change the iron to a third party. 1. 25pm the defendant telegraphed that he had sold the iron. 1. 3pm the plaintiffs, having had no retort to their telegram, telegraphed again, accepting the offer to sell at 40s. cash. 1. 46pm the defendants telegram arrived. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, and the defendant objected that the telegram sent by the plaintiffs on the Monday morning was a rejection of the defendants offer and a new proposal on the plai ntiffs part, and consequently that the defendant had a obligation to discover it as putting an end to the original negotiation.Lush J Looking at the form of the telegram, the time when it was sent, and the state of the iron market, I can not think this is its fair meaning. The plaintiff Stevenson give tongue to he meant it only as an inquiry, expecting an answer for his guidance, and this, I think, is the sense in which the defendant ought to bemuse encountered it. Stevenson, Jacques & Co v. McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346 is an English contract virtue case concerning the rules on talk of acceptance by telegraph. Its approach contrasts to the postal rule. McLean wrote to Stevenson, Jacques & Co. n Middlesbrough asking if he could get an offer for warrants on iron ore. He tell 40s per ton in cash was the lowest price, the offer open work Monday. At 7. 42am, Stevenson telegraphed saying Please wire whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months, or if not, longest limi t you could give. McLean did not answer, and sold at 1. 25pm to person else. Stevenson, before hearing, telegraphed saying he had secured a price. McLean refused to deliver the iron, and Stevenson brought an action for non-delivery.Lush J held that the plaintiffs telegram at 9. 42 was not a rejection of the offer but a mere inquiry about whether the legal injury could be modified. Although McLean was at liberty to eradicate the offer before Monday finished, that was not useful until it reached the plaintiffs. Therefore McLeans offer was serene open when Stevenson accepted it. 11. Power v Lee(266) 12. Felthouse v Bindley (p265) 13. inglesidehold Fire redress v Grant (267) 14. Holwell secutrities v Hughes (p267) 15. Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbHBrinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl 1983 2 AC 34 is a leading decision of the House of Lords on the formation of a contract using telecommunication. The Lords largely accepted the preceding leading decisio n of Entores v Miles hike upmost East Co. 1955 2 QB 327 on acceptance via telex. Brinkibon was a London company that purchased mark from Stahag, a seller based in Austria. Brinkibon sent their acceptance to a Stahag offer by Telex to Vienna. Brinkibon later cherished to issue a writ against Stahag and employ serve an out of legal power party.They would only be able to do so if the contract had been formed in England. The question at issue was where the contract was formed. The Lords discrete that the contract was formed in Vienna. They accepted the principle in Entores v Miles further East Co where in the case of instantaneous communication, which included telex, the formation occurs in the place where the acceptance is received. Lord Wilberforce, however, did not see the rule as applying to all circumstances Since 1955 the use of Telex communication has been greatly expanded, and there are some(prenominal) variants on it.The senders and recipients whitethorn not be the princ ipals to the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with check authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the innovation, or on the premiss that they go away be read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the recipients end which prevents admit at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may receive been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons.And many other variants may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business practise and in some cases by a judgement where the run a essays should lie. 16. Dickinson v Dodds (1876) (p261) Dodds offered to sell Dickson some houses for ? 800. This offer was stated to be left over Friday, 9am. However, Dodds sold the houses to someone else on the Thursday. Dickson heard of this sale indirectly but still handed Dodds a formal acceptance of the offer before 9am.Friday, it was held that no contract was formed with Dickson. The offer had been revoked before acceptance since Dickinson had actually received give away of the invalidation even though this was not from the offeror. (General rule an offer can be revoked (withdrawn or cancelled) by the offeror any time before it is accepted. A revocation is not effective until the offeree becomes aware of it. It is not requirement that offeror personally communicate the revocation to the offeree. It is sufficient if a sane person would be aware that the offer had been withdrawn. 17.Byrne & Co. v. Van Tienhoven & Co. October 1 The defendants, in Cardiff, stick on a letter to the plaintiffs, in new(a) York, offering to sell them 1000 boxes of tinplates. October 8 The defendants posted a letter revoking their offer. October 11The plaintiffs telegraphed acceptance October 15 The plaintiffs confirmed their acceptance by letter. October 20 The defendants letter of revocation reached the plaintiffs. (Revocation is effective when it arrives. Postal acceptance Rule) 18. arise & Frank Co. v Crompton & Bros. The defendant construct carbon paper in England.The plaintiff bought the defendants paper and sold it in new-sprung(prenominal) York. After dealing with each other for a number of years they entered into a written obligation as to the plaintiff having exclusive propers to buy and sell the defendants goods. The agreement stated This agreement is not a formal or legal agreement. It will not be subject to the jurisdiction of either the British or American courts. It is a record of the intention of the parties to which they honorably pledge themselves and is to be carried out with correlative loyalty and friendly co-operation. Following a series of disputes the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was in breach of the agreement and the trial judge held that it was lega lly binding. The defendant appealed and the Court Of conjure overturned the decision it was quite accomplishable for parties to agree that a legal birth would not be formed. Bankes LJ said that an intention to be legally bound was essential. With business arrangements it usually follows as a matter of course that legal relations are intended.Whilst it was most improbable that firms engaged in international business arrangements should not have intended legal consequences there is no legal obstacle to prevent them from doing so. He added further that there is no law or issue of public insurance that should preclude this rule. Thus after version the agreement in its ordinary meaning, he said it is manifest that no action can be maintained on the basis of it. (Intention to create relations) 19. Balfour v Balfour (p271) 20. Merritt v MerrittThe court held that the presumption that agreements between married man and married woman are not intended to create legal relations doesnt ap ply when they are not living in amity but are separated or about to separate. H had left W and was living with another woman. He agreed to pay W ? 40 a month. And signed a written agreement that, in shape of Ws paying off the mortgage on their collectively owned house, he would then maneuverral it to her sole ownership. W give off the jointly owned house, he would then delegate it to her sole ownership. W paid off the mortgage, Stamp J, made a annunciation that W was the sole beneficial owner.Hs appeal was dismissed. Lord Denning saidIn all these cases the court does not try to discover the intention by looking into the minds of the parties. It looks at the situation in which they were put and asks itself would intelligent people regard this agreement as intended to be binding? (google)A husband and wife separated. They then met to make arrangements for the prox. After this the husband agreed to pay ? 40 per month maintenance, out of which the wife would pay the mortgage . When the mortgage was paid off it was agreed he would transfer the house from joint names to the wifes name.He wrote this down and signed the paper, but later refused to transfer the house. It was held that when the agreement was made, the husband and wife were no longer living together, whence they must have intended the agreement to be binding, as they would base their future actions on it. This intention was evidenced by the writing and therefore the husband had to transfer the house to the wife. 21. Jones v Vernons Pools Ltd (p272) 22. White v Bluett (p277) 23. Roscorla v Thomas (p277) 24. Re Caseys Patents (google) A and B owned a patent and C was the manager who had worked on it for two years.A and B then promised C a one-third tract in the invention for his help in developing it. The patents were transferred to C but A and B then claimed their return. It was held that C could rely on the agreement. Even though Cs consideration was in the past, it had been done in a busine ss situation, at the request of A and B and it was unders in like mannerd by both sides that C would be paid and the subsequent promise to pay merely hardened the amount. (past consideration is good if Must be done at the promisors request Parties run into that the act was to be rewarded. Payment must have been legally enforceable had it been promised in advance) 25.Collins v Godefroy This case (Collins v Godefroy 1831 1 BAd 950) is the archetype of cases where a trade imposed by law cannot be shell outn as attachment to support a Contract. Godefroy promised Collins six guineas if he would attend court to rise on his behalf. At his agreement, Collins was subpeonaed. Godefroy refused to pay. In his defence, he claimed that there was no consideration moving from Collins, as he was induce to attend court anyway. This clear was upheld by the court. (It was held that as Collins was under a legal concern to attend court he had not provided consideration.His action therefore faile d. ) 26. Ward v Byham The vex of an illegitimate tike child agreed to pay the capture a sum of money for maintenance, provided that the child be well looked after and happy, and that the aim offer the child the choice of which reboot to live with when she was old enough to understand. The father made retributions until the childs incur married, and then he refused. The mother sued for breach of contract. The fathers defence was that there was no consideration to the agreement, as the mother was legally obligated to worry for the child.The Court of Appeal ruled that the mother had exceeded her statutory duty by bringing up the child in a particular way, and in accordance with the wishes of the father, and this was sufficient consideration. (Do more than public duty is good consideration) 27. Dunton v Dunton (p277) 28. Glasbrook Brothers Ltd v Glamorgan County Council (p278) 29. Stilk v Myrick (p278) 30. Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (p278) 31. Shadwell v Shadwell (279) 32. Har tley v Ponsonby (p279) 33. Pinnels case ( ) The plaintiff sued the defendant for the sum of ? 8 10s.The defence was based on the fact that the defendant had, at the plaintiffs request, tendered ? 5-2s-6d before the debt was due, which the plaintiff had accepted in full rejoicing for the debt. payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the settle that by no possibility, a lesser sum can be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater sum but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, etc. in satisfaction is good as more beneficial to the plaintiff than the money. The rule is obiter dicta.In Pinnels Case itself the debt was paid before the date of satisfaction, which was considered good consideration. 34. Foakes v Beer (p279) 35. Central London property Thust Ltd. v High Tress house Ltd. (p281) 36. Waltons Stores (interstate)Ltd. v Macher (p281) 37. Donoghue v Stevenson (p172) 38. Perre v Apand (p201) 39 . Bolton v pock (p187) 40. Haley v London Electricity gore (photocopy) 41. Pairs v Stepney BC (p190) 42. WATT v HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL 1954 1 WLR 835 DENNING LJ It is well settled that in measuring due care one must balance the run a danger against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk.To that proposition there ought to be added this. One must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any apprehension, there could be no query that the servant would succeed. still the commercial end to make profit is very different from the human end to save spiritedness or limb. The saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk, and I am glad to say there have never been wanting in this rude men of courage misrepresent to take those risks, notably in the end serving.In this case the risk baffling in sending out the dray was not so great as to prohibit the attempt to save life. I quite agr ee that evoke engines, ambulances and doctors cars should not shoot past the traffic lights when they show a red light. That is because the risk is as well as great to warrant the incurring of the danger. It is ever so a question of balancing the risk against the end. Full text SINGLETON LJ The plaintiff was use in the excitement good under the control of the defendants and he was seted at Watford. He had a serious accident on 27 July 1951, as a get out of which he brought this action, claiming insurance for negligence.His case is that the defendants undertook to exertion the care which they owed to him and to other men use in the flame service, and he gives particulars of negligence. There are endlessly dropmen on duty at the ignition identify at Watford, and on 27 July 1951, an emergency call was received there to the effect that there had been an accident and that a woman was trap under a heavy fomite about two coke or three century yards away. In view of the na ture of the emergency the officer in charge, Sub-officer Richards, gave directions that two police squads of men should go out, and he himself went with the first team.It was clear that there faculty be need for lifting apparatus of some kind, and at the fire station there was a prick capable of upbringing heavy weights. The diddly-shit did not break down to the fire service. It was the property of London tape head Executive, whose recitation it is to lend out get up of this kind to various fire stations, and, perhaps, to other bodies, so that they can be on call in case of need. Thus, the shit was on loan to the defendants at this fire station. It is only on rare make that there is an emergency call requiring the service of a rascal of this kind.The plaintiff had been in the fire service in Hertfordshire since 1939, and he had only known of one emergency call on which a twats was required. The defendants had an capital of Texas fomite fitted to hunt this jack. The fi re station at Watford is not a large one, and it had not a great many fomites. The capital of Texas fomite was the only one fitted to carry the jack, but it was not kept purely for that purpose. It had other operate to perform during part of the week, and on this day it was properly out on other service. The jack stands on four diminished wheels, two of which are castored, which means that they may turn all the way round the circle.There was at the fire station only one vehicle on which the jack could be carried in the absence of the Austin vehicle, a Fordson camion, and before leaving with his team Sub-officer Richards told the leading fireman in charge of the second team, of which the plaintiff was a appendage, to take the jack on the lorry. Consequently, the five men in the second team lifted up the jack, which weighed between two and three hundredweight, and put it on to the categoric Fordson lorry, which had boards at the sides and a tailboard. They got on the lorry thems elves, two in the front seat, and three sitting in the body.The plaintiff was in the forward part of the body on the right-hand side, and the other two men there were, perhaps, a little further keister and on the other side, and they held the jack somehow. Obviously there force be movement of the jack in the lorry, for there were no means of securing it, no place on which anything could be tied, and no integral system which would prevent movement. There was, therefore, a risk. The men knew what they were doing. They started their travel, which was only two hundred or three hundred yards.But on the way something happened to cause the device driver to apply his brakes all at once, the jack travel inside the lorry, the plaintiffs leg was caught, and he was injured. In these circumstances he claimed that the defendants, his employers, were careless in that they (a) failed to load or secure the said lifting jack in such a way that it could not become dislodged(b) nonsensical the s aid lifting jack in such a way that they knew or ought to have known it was in all likelihood that if the said lorry pulled up suddenly the same would become dislodged and cause injuries to any person riding on the back of the said lorry(c) permitted and/or caused the laintiff to devolve on on the back of the said lorry on to which the said lifting jack had been loaded as aforesaid(d) caused or permitted the said jack to be transported on the said lorry which as the defendants knew or ought to have known was not provided with clips straps or other sufficient means to secure the same(e) failed to provide any or any adequate supervision of the loading of the said jack on to the said lorry and it was claimed that the plaintiffs accident was due to negligence, and that he was entitled to recover damages against the defendants.Barry J heard the action, and on 16 December 1953, he gave judgment in favour of the defendants, holding that it was not shown that they had been inculpative o f any negligence towards the plaintiff or towards their other employees. I am in complete agreement with his judgment. The fire service is a service which must invariably involve risk for those who are utilize in it, and, as advocate for the plaintiff pointed out, they are entitled to expect that their equipment shall be as good as commonsensible care can secure.An emergency arose as often happens. Mr Richards, the sub-officer who had given the order, was asked in re-examination From your point of view you fancy it was a piece of luck, with this unfortunate woman under the bus, that the Fordson was available and you could use it? A. Yes. It is recognised in the service that we use our initiative at all times, and in doing so any reasonable step you take is considered satisfactory if it is a question of saving life. You have to make a sudden decision. It is not alleged that there was negligence on the part of any particular individual, that the driver was negligent in driving t oo fast, or that Sub-officer Richards was negligent in giving the order which he did. The case put forward by counsel for the plaintiff in this court is that, as the defendants had a jack, it was their duty to have a vehicle fitted in all respects to carry that jack, from which it follows, I suppose, that it is said a vehicle must be kept at the fire station at all times, or that, if there is not one, the lifting jack must not be taken out.Indeed, counsel claimed that, in the case of such an item as this, if there was no vehicle fitted to carry the jack, the sub-officer ought to have telephoned to the fire station at St Albans and arranged that they should attend to the emergency. St Albans is some seven miles away, and it was said an extra ten minutes or so would have elapsed if that had been done. I cannot think that is the right way to approach the matter. There was a real emergency. The woman was under a heavy vehicle.These men in the fire service thought they ought to go promp tly, and thought they ought to take a lifting jack, and they did so. Most unfortunately this accident to the plaintiff happened. The duty owed by employers has been stated often. Lord Herschell in Smith v Baker & Sons said (1891 AC 362) It is quite clear that the contract between employer and employed involves on the part of the actor the duty of taking reasonable care to provide proper appliances, and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to redundant risk. The employee in this case was a member of the fire service, who always undertake some risk, though, according to counsel for the plaintiff, not this risk. Is it to be said that, if an emergency call reaches a fire station, the person in charge has to ponder on the matter in this way Must I send out my men with the lifting jack in these circumstances, or must I telephone to St Albans, seven miles away, to ask them to undertake the assign? I suppose he must think about his duty, but what would a reasonable man do placed as he was?Would the evenhandedly alert head of the station have done anything other than that which Sub-officer Richards did? I think not. goat it be said, then, that there is a duty on the employers here, the defendants, to have a vehicle built and fitted to carry this jack at all times, or, if they have not, not to take the jack for a short journey of two or three hundred yards? I do not think that will do. Asquith LJ in Daborn v clean Tramways Motor Co Ltd & Trevor Smithey said (4946 2 All ER 336) In find out whether a party is negligent, the standard of reasonable care is that which is reasonably to be demanded in the circumstances.A relevant circumstance to take into account may be the splendour of the end to be served by behaving in this way or in that. As has often been pointed out, if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of five miles an hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be unacceptably slowed down. The purpose to be served, if sufficiently important, justifies the assumption of abnormal risk. The purpose to be served in this case was the saving of life. The men were wide-awake to take that risk.They were not, in my view, called on to take any risk other than that which ordinarily might be encountered in this service. I agree with Barry J that, on the whole of the evidence which was given, it would not be right to find that the defendants as employers were guilty of any failure of the duty which they owed to their workmen. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. DENNING LJ It is well settled that in measuring due care one must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk. To that proposition there ought to be added this.One must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any emergency, there could be no doubt that the ser vant would succeed. But the commercial end to make profit is very different from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk, and I am glad to say there have never been wanting in this country men of courage ready to take those risks, notably in the fire service. In this case the risk affect in sending out the lorry was not so great as to prohibit the attempt to save life.I quite agree that fire engines, ambulances and doctors cars should not shoot past the traffic lights when they show a red light. That is because the risk is too great to warrant the incurring of the danger. It is always a question of balancing the risk against the end. I agree with my Lord that this appeal should be dismissed. MORRIS LJ I also agree. The accident in this case came about as a result of a jolly unusual concatenation of circumstances. There had for a long time been no call for the use of the jack.Any such call, according to the evidence, was ext remely rare. It so happened that a call came at a time when the Austin vehicle which would normally have carried the jack was otherwise engaged. I do not think it can be said to have been unreasonable to have had the Austin vehicle for use in the way that was arranged. Had the fire station been larger, had there been interminable resources, unlimited space, and an unlimited number of vehicles, then it may be that another fitted vehicle would have been available. But that was not reasonably practicable or possible.When the call for the jack came, Mr Richards had to decide what to do, and I do not think that it would have been in accordance with the traditions of the fire service if he had said that he could do nothing other than call on St Albans. What he inflexible to do was in accordance with the practice of the fire service. Mr Bottin, the assistant chief officer in the London Fire Brigade, talk of the provision of jacks, pointed out that in London there are twenty-nine sets of lifting gear, one being provided for every two stations. He said in evidence Q. fire you always undertake that that one vehicle will be available for the transport of a jack? A. No. Q. In your view is it reasonably practicable for a fire service to adapt all of its vehicles for the transport of jacks? A. No. I would not think it was reasonable. Q. You have been a station officer, have you not? A. I have. Q. Supposing you found yourself in charge of a station, and supposing the equipment available was not that most suitable for the purpose but you found that human life was in danger and you might save it by adopting a method not entirely suitable, what in your view would be your duty as a station officer?A. I have had that experience, and I did not hesitate to get the equipment there as quickly as possible. As I have said, I think Mr Richards acted in accordance with the traditions of the service, and I cannot for one moment think that the employers could be held responsibl e as having failed in the performance of their duties. I agree that the appeal fails. 43. Rogers v Whitaker (p189) 44. Barnett v Chelsea Hospital 45. March v E. & M. H Stramare Pty. Ltd.