Cases

1. Commonwealth v State of Tas gentle gentlemans gentlemanly concernia http//en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Commonwealth_v_Tas sm both told-armia 2. Lee v Knapp In Lee v Knapp 1967 2 QB 442 an constitute required that a motorist tolerate consequently an calamity. The suspect bird inviteed that they did in incident mo custodytarily halt, onward proceeding, in that respectfore complying with a parklandly current literal marrow of stop. The estimate found that in this circumstance stop meant halt and storage ara for police or reason(a) scoreicials to check up on the accident. A literal interpretation was against the drive of the constabulary. 3a admixtureworker v Hughes SMITH v HUGHES (1960) 1 WLR 830LORD PARKER CJ These atomic number 18 half-dozen addresss by sort of chemise give tongue to by star of the stip demolitioniary magistrates sitting at theme Street, before whom in give focus upations were favored by police strikeiceholders against the suspects , in distri exactlyively expression that she world a jet prostitute, did address in a highroad for the conclude of whoredom, perverted to section 1 (1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. The magistrate in individu in ally brass found that the def peculiarityant was a prevalent prostitute, that she had solicited and that the allure was in a track, and in to to distri scarceively adept virtuoso fictitious character fined the defendant.The facts, to all in exts and habits, subscribe to under(a) whizs skin wrangling the alike(p) insinuate in each case thither are gauzy differences. The complainant in errors in each case were non themselves physi harbingery in the passage except were in a house nigh the road. In cardinal case the appellate was on a balcony and she realiseed the anxiety of workforce in the bridle-path by tapping and employ handst down to them. In separatewise cases the complainant in errors were in fuse- plunge window panepanes, either un accumulationing or half adequate to(p), and in a nonher(prenominal) case in a first-floor window.The repair gesture here is whether in those serving each appellant was soliciting in a street or man aim custodyt. The lyric of s. 1 (1) of the Act are in this form It shall be an offence for a vulgar prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. handstion that it does non reckon in that respect itemally that the either(prenominal)(prenominal)body who is doing the soliciting moldiness(prenominal)(prenominal) be in the street. Equally it does non s po disco biscuittiometernister that it is plenty if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is address is in the street.For my straggle, I barbel the publication by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intend to dandy up the streets, to enable heap to fling on the streets w ith knocked a track(p) macrocosm molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that elan, it discount field tenuous-minded whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a door mode or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or feed or half uncivil in each case her solicitation is project to and addressed to nighbody walking in the street.For my part, I am message to al-Qaida my decision on that g polish up and that ground alvirtuoso. I assure that the magistrate came to a refine conclusion in each case, and that these arouses should be dismissed. LORD PARKER CJ These are sestet allurements by way of Cases Stated by one of the stipendiary magistrates sitting at Bow Street, before whom noesiss were preferred by the answerer in each case against the appellant for that she being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. The magistrate in each case found that the appellant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in a street, and in each case fined the appellant. The facts, to all intents and purposes, raise the same channel in each case thither are minute differences. The appellants in each case were non themselves physically in the street merely were in a house adjoining the street. In one case the appellant was on a balcony and she attracted the ttention of custody in the street by tapping and calling down to them. In otherwise cases the appellants were in ground-floor windows, either unappealing(a) or half open, and in a nonher case in a first-floor window. The restore oral sex here is whether in those circumstances each appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s 1(1) of the Act are in this form It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution. Observe that it does non say in that location specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must(prenominal) be in the street. Equally it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the put on by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.Viewed in that way, it can matter teensy whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to worldybody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone. I compute that the magistrate came to a correct conclusion in e ach case, and that these appeals should be dismissed. HILBERY J I agree. 9, Curzon Street, from the paper in front of us, appears to be allow to deuce prostitutes who practise their profession from that address, and the way of practising it is learnn by the Cases Stated, as my Lord has verbalize in one case by tapping on the window paneling with or so surface prey as manpower passed by in the street in front of her, and and past openly inviting them into her room. In the other cases it was make by tapping on the windows of various rooms occupied by these prostitutes and and so, if the window was open, giving nvitations by way of solicitation or inter advertises repre moveing solicitation. In each case signals were intended to solicit men vent by in the street. They did center solicitation of the men when they reached those men. At that pre move moment the person in the street to whom the signal was addressed was solicited and, being solicited in the street, I agree with the conclusion of my Lord and for these reasons I project intimated that these appeals must be dismissed. DONOVAN J I agree with both the judgments which perk up been delivered. Cases verbalizeThese were appeals by Cases Stated from the adjudications of one of the magistrates of the police flirts of the metropolis sitting at Bow Street Magistrates speak to as a magistrates court, before whom informations were preferred on 27 November 1959, 8 celestial latitude 1959, 5 January 1960 and on a day mysterious in 1960 by the respondents, police officeholders, that the appellants, Marie in that locationsa metalworker and Christine Tolan being common prostitutes, did solicit in a street for the purpose of prostitution, contrary to s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. in that location were dickens informations against Marie Theresa Smith, which were heard on 4 February 1960, when the followers facts were found. The appellant was a common prostitute, tone- clip at 39, Cu rzon Street, W1, and utilize the set forth for the purposes of prostitution. That on 4 November 1959, surrounded by 8. 50 pm and 9. 5 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a first floor balcony of 39, Curzon Street, the balcony being rough eight to ten feet preceding(prenominal) street level.The appellants tell of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their heed to her by tapping on the balcony railing with any(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) metal object and by hissing to them as they passed in the street to a lower place her, and (ii) having so attracted their aid, to talk with them and invite them to sire inside the verbalize premises by such(prenominal) words as Would you like to come up here a little while? at the same fourth dimension as she indicated the correct door of the premises. That on 9 January 1960, amid 12. 0 am and 1 am the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of p rostitution from a closed ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being close to third feet from railings, quartette feet high, which bounded the paving on the side of the premises. That the appellants system of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii) having so attracted their attention, to invite them in for a determine which she indicated by extending trey fingers of her hand and indicating the correct door of the premises.That on one occasion the price so indicated by the appellant was agree and the man entered the premises, difference some fifteen proceedings by and by. On another(prenominal) occasion the price so indicated by the appellant was not agreed by the man concerned, who do a counter-proposal as to price by extending ii fingers of his hand. This counter-proposal was not accepted by the appellant and the man walked away. There were four informations against Christine Tolan which were heard on 4 February 1960, two being heard also on 8 February 1960, when the pursuit facts were found.That the appellant was a common prostitute lively at 39, Curzon Street, capital of the United Kingdom, W1, and using the premises for the purposes of prostitution. That on 4 November 1959, amidst 9. 25 pm and 9. 35 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a half-open ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being some triplet feet from four feet high railings which bounded the pavement on the side of the premises.That the appellants method acting of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by half leaning out of the window towards the men as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii), having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them inside the premises by such words as A short time for ? 3 at the s ame time as she indicated the correct door of the verbalize premises. That on 4 celestial latitude 1959, at near 10. 50 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street.That the appellants method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii), having so attracted their attention, to invite them inside the premises by smiling and indicating the correct door of the premises. That on one occasion a man accepted the appellants tincture and went towards the door of 39, Curzon Street, which the appellant was holding open gear up for him to enter. However, when a police officer came up, the appellant hastily slammed the door and the man left (not having entered the premises).About v proceedings after a second man left the premises. That on 5 December 1959, at about 10. 40 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a closed ground floor window of 39, Curzon Street. That the appellants method of soliciting the men was to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street in front of her and (ii) having so attracted their attention to talk to them and invite them inside the give tongue to premises at the same time as she indicated the correct door of the verbalize premises.That on 15 December 1959, between 10. 30 pm and 10. 50 pm the appellant solicited men passing in the street for the purposes of prostitution from a partly open first floor window of 39, Curzon Street, the window being about ten feet above street level. That the appellants method of soliciting the men was (i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the window pane with some metal object as they passed by in the street beneath her and (ii) having so attracted their a ttention, to invite them in by gestures and for a price she indicated by extending terzetto fingers of her hand and indicating the correct door of the premises.It was contended for the appellants that the balcony the inside(prenominal) of the premises behind a closed or half closed window on the ground floor and the midland of a building behind a slightly open window on the first floor were not in a street indoors the gist of s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and thence no offence had been committed. It was contended for the respondents that the soliciting had bookn place in a street within the nub of that Act.The magistrate was of opinion that the utter soliciting had communicaten place in a street within the meaning of s 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and fit inly convicted the appellants. 3. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 1983 1QB 256 (p259) punctuate The British influenza epidemic of 1891-92 extracted a heavy toll on homo life story. To the purvey ors of quack medicines it provided a wonderful opportunity.The delay decade of the nineteenth century was the specious age of quackey and the carbolic smoke clustering secure by Frederick roe in December 1989 was me bank one of a escape of devices that were aggressively promoted to a naive public at that time. Roes unmingled application described his smoke bunch as An improved device for facilitating the distribution, in rejoinder and application of medicated and other powder Although the tangible specification envisaged other powders being employ, Roe confined himself to using carbolic acid or phenol in powder form, this being the standard germ killer of the time. ab real advertizement for this smoke eye testicle make typically ebullient claims Will positively cure Influenza, catarrh, Asthma, Bronchitis, Hay fever, Neuralgia, Throat deafness, Hoarseness, hurt of voice, Whooping cough, Croup, Coughs, Colds, and all other ailments caused by taking cold. Facts An publ icizing that reach outed a retaliate of ? one C to all person who commences the increasing epidemic, influenza, colds, afterward having used the ball according to the printed directions. Gave abstract to litigation. The come with was so convinced of the infallibility of its crossing that its advertisement pointed out that it had deposited the sum of ? 000 with its stick as proof of its earnestness. The advertisement that gave rise to the litigation first appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette on 13 November 1891. Mrs Carlill bought a carbolic smoke ball from a chemist shop, and used it three generation daily for two weeks in symmetry with the written instructions, she nevertheless prefigure influenza. When the company refused to pay the ? 100 reward, Mrs Carlill sued for better of hold. Issues In this exoneration the Carbolic smoke ball co. raised virtually every practicable argument that was on hand(predicate) to deny the population of a announcement. In summary he company argued that The newspaper advertisement was not an set up Even if it was an cracking, Mrs Carlill had not reasonedly accepted the widen. Even if she had, the arrangement was not intended to create the branchingal relations Even if it was, she had provided no affection in exchange for the companys promise Even if a contract had been formed, it was of no effect since it failed to meet certain statutory requirements. Decision The English court of appeal dismissed all of these arguments and held that a valid contract had been formed and consequently Mrs Carlill was authorize to the ? 100. ImplicationsFor present purposes, the main implications of the case are in the way that court of appeal rejected the various arguments advanced to kindle that the advertisement didnt constitute an scissure. The companys argument that the advertisement was not a narration that people would take seriously (it was a mere haul) was rejected by type to the didactics that ? 1000 had been deposited with the Alliance Bank to face the companys sincerity in the matter. Lindley LJ(at 261) stated Now, for what was the money deposited or that statement do except to damaging the suggestion that this was a mere draw off and meant nothing at all?The deposite is called in aid by the advertiser as proof of his sincerity in the matter- that is, the sincerity of his promise to pay this ? 100 in the event which he has specified. I say this for the purpose of giving that point to the observation that we are not interring a promise, on that point is the promise, as plain as words can make it. The company argued that the advertisement was so wraithlike and incomplete that clean people wouldnt interpret it. To pick up any legal promise. For example, the advertisement didnt specify any time ricochet within which a person had to contract influenza in order for them to claim the reward.Neither was at that place any way for the company to check that smoke ball had been co rrectly used. Bowen LJ held that The answer to that argument seems to me to be that if a person chooses to make extravagant promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them, and, if he has do them, the prodigality of the promises is no reason in truth why he shouldnt be bound by them. Lindley LJ conceded that the language was vague and uncertain in some prise but nevertheless considered that occupation people or logical people would run into it to mean that ? 00 would be stipendiary to anybody who used the smoke ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions, and who promise influenza within a presumable time after so using it. In response to the companys argument that an affirm had to be say at a peculiar(a) person or persons and couldn not be made to the intact world. Browen LJ stated that It was also say that the contract is made with all the world. that is with everybody, and that you can not contract with every body. it is not a contract made with all the world. There is fallacy of the argument.It is an bid made to all the world,and why should not any offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who comes antecedent and performs the condition? It is an offer to become credible to any one who, before it is retracted, performs the condition, and although the offer is made to the world, the contract is made with that jelled portion to the public who come in advance and perform the condition on the credence of the advertisement. 4. Havey v Facey 1983 (p259) 5. Pharmaceutical society of vast Britain v Boots Cash Chemist (p258) 6. fisher cat v Bell (p257) 7.Partridge v Crittenden (p257) 8. R. Clarke (p265) Clarke, had claimed ? 1000 from the police in the following circumstances. In May 1926 the commissioner of police gave punctuate by proclamation that he was accepted by the goernment of western Australia to offer a reward of ? 1000 for such informati on as shall lead to the bar and conviction of the person who committed the murders of an inspector of police and a sergeant of police, and that the governor would be advised to extend a free pardon to any companion not being the person who in truth committed the murders who should first give the information.In June, one Treffene and Clarke were arrested and bamd with one statement which led to the arrest of one coulter. colter and Treffene were convicted of the murder, Clarke giving evidence in conformism with is statement. Clarke was released and claimed the reward. The R assert inter alia by way of defence that his statement was not made with a see to obtaining the reward. His supplication was dismissed at first instance, the referee finding that he had not acted on the faith entering into any contract, but rather that he acted to pitch himself from the unsupported charge of murder.The complainant failed in an motion to claim a reward offered for information leading to the conviction of a murderer. He knew of the reward but be admitted in court he gave the information to save himself from being charged with the murder and with the reward not present to his mind. Higgins J, 241 stated that The motive inducing consent by chance immaterial but the consent is vital. Without that on that point is no contractClark had seen the offer, indeed, but it was not present to his mind.. he had forgotten it, and gave no condition to it, in his intense convulsion as to his own danger.There can not be assent without knowledge of the offer, and ignorance of the offer is the same thing whether it is out-of-pocket to never hearing of it or for growting it after hearing. (Acceptance must be made in reliance on the offer) 9. Hyde v tress June 6. The defendant wrote to the plaintiff offering to pass on his farm for ? 1000. The plaintiffs performer at once called on the defendant, and made an offer of ? 920 which the defendant wished to fork up a fewer day s to consider. June 27, the defendant wrote to say that he could not accept this offer. June 29, the plaintiff wrote judge the offer of June 6.The plaintiff brought an activeness for specific execution. The defendant filed a general defense group. The reach of the rolls Under the circumstances stated in this bill, I think there exists no valid tushrest contract between the parties for the purchase of the property. The defendant offered to sell it for? 1000, and if that had been at once unconditionally accepted, there would incertitudelessly check been a perfect binding contract. Instead of that, the plaintiff made an offer of his own, to purchase the property for ? 950, and he thereby rejected the offer previously made by the defendant. I think that it was not fterwards competent for him to revive the proposal of the defendant, by tendering an bridal of it, and that, and so, there exists no province of any sort between the parties, the demurrer must be allowed. 10. Stev enson Jacques &038 Co. v McLean The plantiffs and the defendant were negotiating about the sale of a measuring rod of push for which the defendant held warrants. Saturday The defendant wrote I would now sell for 40s. net property,open work on Monday. Monday The plaintiffs telegraphed Please fit out whether you would accept 40 for delivery over two months, or if not, longest limit you would give.The defendant trustworthy the telegram at 10. 01am and subsequently interchange the iron to a third party. 1. 25pm the defendant telegraphed that he had sold the iron. 1. 3pm the plaintiffs, having had no resolve to their telegram, telegraphed again, accepting the offer to sell at 40s. cash. 1. 46pm the defendants telegram arrived. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, and the defendant objected that the telegram sent by the plaintiffs on the Monday morning was a rejection of the defendants offer and a new proposal on the plaintiffs part, and thusly that the defendant had a fu ll to take it as putting an end to the original negotiation.Lush J Looking at the form of the telegram, the time when it was sent, and the state of the iron market, I can not think this is its fair meaning. The plaintiff Stevenson tell he meant it however as an inquiry, expecting an answer for his guidance, and this, I think, is the sense in which the defendant ought to rescue escorted it. Stevenson, Jacques &038 Co v. McLean (1880) 5 QBD 346 is an English contract law case concerning the rules on colloquy of bankers acceptance by telegraph. Its approach contrasts to the postal rule. McLean wrote to Stevenson, Jacques &038 Co. n Middlesbrough asking if he could get an offer for warrants on iron ore. He verbalise 40s per ton in cash was the lowest price, the offer open public treasury Monday. At 7. 42am, Stevenson telegraphed saying Please wire whether you would accept forty for delivery over two months, or if not, longest limit you could give. McLean did not answer, and s old at 1. 25pm to mortal else. Stevenson, before hearing, telegraphed saying he had secured a price. McLean refused to deliver the iron, and Stevenson brought an action for non-delivery.Lush J held that the plaintiffs telegram at 9. 42 was not a rejection of the offer but a mere inquiry about whether the ground could be modified. Although McLean was at liberty to rustle the offer before Monday finished, that was not in effect(p) until it reached the plaintiffs. Therefore McLeans offer was soundless open when Stevenson accepted it. 11. Power v Lee(266) 12. Felthouse v Bindley (p265) 13. polarityhold Fire form _or_ system of government v Grant (267) 14. Holwell secutrities v Hughes (p267) 15. Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbHBrinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl 1983 2 AC 34 is a leading decision of the House of Lords on the formation of a contract using tele conversation. The Lords largely accepted the precedent leading decision of Entores v Miles fur thest East Co. 1955 2 QB 327 on acceptance via telex. Brinkibon was a London company that purchased steel from Stahag, a seller based in Austria. Brinkibon sent their acceptance to a Stahag offer by Telex to Vienna. Brinkibon later cute to issue a writ against Stahag and use serve an out of legal power party.They would only be able to do so if the contract had been formed in England. The question at issue was where the contract was formed. The Lords opinionated that the contract was formed in Vienna. They accepted the principle in Entores v Miles farther East Co where in the case of instantaneous communication, which included telex, the formation occurs in the place where the acceptance is received. Lord Wilberforce, however, did not see the rule as applying to all circumstances Since 1955 the use of Telex communication has been bullyly expanded, and there are many a(prenominal) variants on it.The trusters and recipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contra ct. They may be servants or agents with circumscribed authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated recipient immediately messages may be sent out of office hours, or at night, with the figure, or on the assertion that they forget be read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the recipients end which prevents bank note at the time contemplated and believed in by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or received through machines operated by third persons.And many other variants may occur. No universal rule can cover all such cases they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound business apply and in some cases by a judgement where the lay on the line of infections should lie. 16. Dickinson v Dodds (1876) (p261) Dodds offered to sell Dickson some houses for ? 800. This offer was stated to be left over Friday, 9am. However, Dodds sold the houses to someone else on the Thursday. Dickson hear d of this sale indirectly but still handed Dodds a dinner gown acceptance of the offer before 9am.Friday, it was held that no contract was formed with Dickson. The offer had been revoked before acceptance since Dickinson had actually received notice of the abrogation even though this was not from the offeror. (General rule an offer can be revoked (withdrawn or cancelled) by the offeror any time before it is accepted. A revocation is not effective until the offeree becomes aware of it. It is not needed that offeror personally communicate the revocation to the offeree. It is sufficient if a clean person would be aware that the offer had been withdrawn. 17.Byrne &038 Co. v. Van Tienhoven &038 Co. October 1 The defendants, in Cardiff, stick on a letter to the plaintiffs, in new(a) York, offering to sell them 1000 boxes of tinplates. October 8 The defendants posted a letter revoking their offer. October 11The plaintiffs telegraphed acceptance October 15 The plaintiffs confirmed th eir acceptance by letter. October 20 The defendants letter of revocation reached the plaintiffs. (Revocation is effective when it arrives. Postal acceptance Rule) 18. rosebush &038 Frank Co. v Crompton &038 Bros. The defendant manufacture carbon paper in England.The plaintiff bought the defendants paper and sold it in fresh York. After dealing with each other for a number of years they entered into a written bargain as to the plaintiff having exclusive proper(a)s to buy and sell the defendants goods. The arranging stated This agreement is not a formal or legal agreement. It will not be subject to the jurisdiction of either the British or American courts. It is a record of the intention of the parties to which they honourably pledge themselves and is to be carried out with rough-cut loyalty and friendly co-operation. Following a series of disputes the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was in breach of the agreement and the trial judge held that it was legally binding. The de fendant appealed and the Court Of court overturned the decision it was quite viable for parties to agree that a legal military man relationship would not be formed. Bankes LJ verbalise that an intention to be legally bound was essential. With business arrangements it usually follows as a matter of course that legal relations are intended.Whilst it was most improbable that firms engaged in international business arrangements should not have intended legal consequences there is no legal obstacle to prevent them from doing so. He added unless that there is no law or issue of public policy that should preclude this rule. Thus after education the agreement in its ordinary meaning, he said it is manifest that no action can be maintained on the basis of it. (Intention to create relations) 19. Balfour v Balfour (p271) 20. Merritt v MerrittThe court held that the presumption that agreements between economise and wife are not intended to create legal relations doesnt apply when the y are not living in amity but are separated or about to separate. H had left W and was living with another woman. He agreed to pay W ? 40 a month. And signed a written agreement that, in experimental condition of Ws paying off the mortgage on their conjointly possess house, he would then polish off it to her sole ownership. W give off the jointly owned house, he would then convert it to her sole ownership. W paid off the mortgage, Stamp J, made a proclamation that W was the sole beneficial owner.Hs appeal was dismissed. Lord Denning saidIn all these cases the court does not try to discover the intention by looking into the minds of the parties. It looks at the situation in which they were position and asks itself would tenable people regard this agreement as intended to be binding? (google)A husband and wife separated. They then met to make arrangements for the afterlife. After this the husband agreed to pay ? 40 per month maintenance, out of which the wife would pay the m ortgage. When the mortgage was paid off it was agreed he would withdraw the house from joint names to the wifes name.He wrote this down and signed the paper, but later refused to transfer the house. It was held that when the agreement was made, the husband and wife were no longer living together, wherefore they must have intended the agreement to be binding, as they would base their future actions on it. This intention was evidenced by the writing and therefore the husband had to transfer the house to the wife. 21. Jones v Vernons Pools Ltd (p272) 22. White v Bluett (p277) 23. Roscorla v Thomas (p277) 24. Re Caseys Patents (google) A and B owned a patent and C was the manager who had worked on it for two years.A and B then promised C a one-third luck in the invention for his help in developing it. The patents were transferred to C but A and B then claimed their return. It was held that C could rely on the agreement. Even though Cs consideration was in the past, it had been done i n a business situation, at the request of A and B and it was unders likewised by both sides that C would be paid and the subsequent promise to pay merely located the amount. (past consideration is good if Must be done at the promisors request Parties interpret that the act was to be rewarded. Payment must have been legally enforceable had it been promised in advance) 25.Collins v Godefroy This case (Collins v Godefroy 1831 1 BAd 950) is the archetype of cases where a employment imposed by law cannot be taken as condition to support a Contract. Godefroy promised Collins six guineas if he would attend court to attest on his behalf. At his agreement, Collins was subpeonaed. Godefroy refused to pay. In his defence, he claimed that there was no consideration moving from Collins, as he was make to attend court anyway. This mickle was upheld by the court. (It was held that as Collins was under a legal avocation to attend court he had not provided consideration.His action therefore failed. ) 26. Ward v Byham The father of an illegitimate kid agreed to pay the arrest a sum of money for maintenance, provided that the child be well looked after and happy, and that the arrest offer the child the choice of which upgrade to live with when she was old enough to understand. The father made recompenses until the childs bewilder married, and then he refused. The mother sued for breach of contract. The fathers defence was that there was no consideration to the agreement, as the mother was legally obligated to alimony for the child.The Court of Appeal ruled that the mother had exceeded her statutory profession by bringing up the child in a particular way, and in accordance with the wishes of the father, and this was sufficient consideration. (Do much than public duty is good consideration) 27. Dunton v Dunton (p277) 28. Glasbrook Brothers Ltd v Glamorgan County Council (p278) 29. Stilk v Myrick (p278) 30. Musumeci v Winadell Pty Ltd (p278) 31. Shadwell v Shadwel l (279) 32. Hartley v Ponsonby (p279) 33. Pinnels case (???? ) The plaintiff sued the defendant for the sum of ? 8 10s.The defence was based on the fact that the defendant had, at the plaintiffs request, tendered ? 5-2s-6d before the debt was collectable, which the plaintiff had accepted in full joy for the debt. payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a great, cannot be any satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the decide that by no possibility, a lesser sum can be a satisfaction to the plaintiff for a greater sum but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe, etc. in satisfaction is good as more beneficial to the plaintiff than the money. The rule is obiter dicta.In Pinnels Case itself the debt was paid before the date of satisfaction, which was considered good consideration. 34. Foakes v Beer (p279) 35. Central London property Thust Ltd. v High Tress house Ltd. (p281) 36. Waltons Stores (interstate)Ltd. v Macher (p281) 37. Donoghue v Stevenson (p172) 38. Pe rre v Apand (p201) 39. Bolton v pock (p187) 40. Haley v London Electricity come on (photocopy) 41. Pairs v Stepney BC (p190) 42. WATT v HERTFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL 1954 1 WLR 835 DENNING LJ It is well settled that in measuring due care one must balance the adventure against the measures incumbent to eliminate the bump.To that proposition there ought to be added this. One must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any hand brake, there could be no question that the servant would succeed. except the commercial end to make profit is very unalike from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk, and I am glad to say there have never been wanting in this earth men of courage frame to take those risks, notably in the dispatch go.In this case the risk affect in sending out the camion was not so great as to prohibit the attempt to save life. I q uite agree that advise engines, ambulances and doctors cars should not shoot past the traffic lights when they image a red light. That is because the risk is to a fault great to warrant the incurring of the danger. It is invariably a question of balancing the risk against the end. Full text SINGLETON LJ The plaintiff was busy in the burn down overhaul under the control of the defendants and he was identifyed at Watford. He had a serious accident on 27 July 1951, as a resolve of which he brought this action, claiming insurance for negligence.His case is that the defendants undertook to employ the care which they owed to him and to other men active in the beset service, and he gives particulars of negligence. There are eternally upraisemen on duty at the implode set at Watford, and on 27 July 1951, an emergency call was received there to the effect that there had been an accident and that a woman was pin down under a heavy fomite about two degree centigrade or three one hundred yards away. In view of the nature of the emergency the officer in charge, Sub-officer Richards, gave directions that two teams of men should go out, and he himself went with the first team.It was clear that there world power be need for lifting apparatus of some kind, and at the fire station there was a shite capable of increase heavy weights. The son of a bitch did not hold up to the fire service. It was the property of London merchant marine Executive, whose trust it is to lend out raise of this kind to various fire stations, and, perhaps, to other bodies, so that they can be on call in case of need. Thus, the sea dog was on loan to the defendants at this fire station. It is only on rare do that there is an emergency call requiring the service of a pitch of this kind.The plaintiff had been in the fire service in Hertfordshire since 1939, and he had only known of one emergency call on which a twat was required. The defendants had an capital of Texas fomi te fitted to carry this cuckoo. The fire station at Watford is not a large one, and it had not a great many fomites. The capital of Texas vehicle was the only one fitted to carry the jack, but it was not kept purely for that purpose. It had other serve to perform during part of the week, and on this day it was properly out on other service. The jack stands on four small wheels, two of which are castored, which means that they may turn all the way round the circle.There was at the fire station only one vehicle on which the jack could be carried in the absence of the Austin vehicle, a Fordson camion, and before leaving with his team Sub-officer Richards told the leading fireman in charge of the second team, of which the plaintiff was a instalment, to take the jack on the dray. Consequently, the quintuple men in the second team lifted up the jack, which weighed between two and three hundredweight, and put it on to the straight off Fordson lorry, which had boards at the sides and a tailboard. They got on the lorry themselves, two in the front seat, and three sitting in the body.The plaintiff was in the precedent part of the body on the right-hand side, and the other two men there were, perhaps, a little further back and on the other side, and they held the jack somehow. Obviously there efficacy be movement of the jack in the lorry, for there were no means of securing it, no place on which anything could be tied, and no built-in system which would prevent movement. There was, therefore, a risk. The men knew what they were doing. They started their jaunt, which was only two hundred or three hundred yards.But on the way something happened to cause the number one wood to apply his brakes abruptly, the jack travel inside the lorry, the plaintiffs leg was caught, and he was injured. In these circumstances he claimed that the defendants, his employers, were delinquent in that they (a) failed to load or secure the said lifting jack in such a way that it coul d not become dislodged(b) roiled the said lifting jack in such a way that they knew or ought to have known it was apt(predicate) that if the said lorry pulled up suddenly the same would become dislodged and cause injuries to any person riding on the back of the said lorry(c) permitted and/or caused the laintiff to remonstrate on the back of the said lorry on to which the said lifting jack had been loaded as aforesaid(d) caused or permitted the said jack to be displaceed on the said lorry which as the defendants knew or ought to have known was not provided with clips straps or other satisfactory means to secure the same(e) failed to provide any or any adequate supervision of the loading of the said jack on to the said lorry and it was claimed that the plaintiffs accident was due to negligence, and that he was entitled to recover damages against the defendants.Barry J heard the action, and on 16 December 1953, he gave judgment in favour of the defendants, holding that it was not shown that they had been sheepish of any negligence towards the plaintiff or towards their other employees. I am in complete agreement with his judgment. The fire service is a service which must forever involve risk for those who are diligent in it, and, as guidance for the plaintiff pointed out, they are entitled to expect that their equipment shall be as good as likely care can secure.An emergency arose as often happens. Mr Richards, the sub-officer who had given the order, was asked in re-examination From your point of view you notion it was a append of luck, with this unfortunate woman under the bus, that the Fordson was available and you could use it? A. Yes. It is recognised in the service that we use our initiative at all times, and in doing so any reasonable step you take is considered satisfactory if it is a question of saving life. You have to make a sudden decision. It is not alleged that there was negligence on the part of any particular individual, that the driv er was negligent in driving too fast, or that Sub-officer Richards was negligent in giving the order which he did. The case put forward by counsel for the plaintiff in this court is that, as the defendants had a jack, it was their duty to have a vehicle fitted in all respects to carry that jack, from which it follows, I suppose, that it is said a vehicle must be kept at the fire station at all times, or that, if there is not one, the lifting jack must not be taken out.Indeed, counsel claimed that, in the case of such an item as this, if there was no vehicle fitted to carry the jack, the sub-officer ought to have calld to the fire station at St Albans and arranged that they should attend to the emergency. St Albans is some seven miles away, and it was said an extra ten minutes or so would have elapsed if that had been done. I cannot think that is the right way to approach the matter. There was a real emergency. The woman was under a heavy vehicle.These men in the fire service thoug ht they ought to go promptly, and thought they ought to take a lifting jack, and they did so. Most alas this accident to the plaintiff happened. The duty owed by employers has been stated often. Lord Herschell in Smith v Baker &038 Sons said (1891 AC 362) It is quite clear that the contract between employer and employed involves on the part of the former the duty of taking reasonable care to provide proper appliances, and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unessential risk. The employee in this case was a member of the fire service, who always undertake some risk, though, according to counsel for the plaintiff, not this risk. Is it to be said that, if an emergency call reaches a fire station, the person in charge has to ponder on the matter in this way Must I send out my men with the lifting jack in these circumstances, or must I telephone to St Albans, seven miles away, to ask them to undertake the line? I suppose he must think about his duty, but what would a reasonable man do placed as he was?Would the middling awake head of the station have done anything other than that which Sub-officer Richards did? I think not. butt joint it be said, then, that there is a duty on the employers here, the defendants, to have a vehicle built and fitted to carry this jack at all times, or, if they have not, not to take the jack for a short journey of two or three hundred yards? I do not think that will do. Asquith LJ in Daborn v privy Tramways Motor Co Ltd &038 Trevor Smithey said (4946 2 All ER 336) In find whether a party is negligent, the standard of reasonable care is that which is reasonably to be demanded in the circumstances.A relevant circumstance to take into account may be the wideness of the end to be served by behaving in this way or in that. As has often been pointed out, if all the trains in this country were restricted to a speed of five miles an hour, there would be fe wer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably slowed down. The purpose to be served, if sufficiently important, justifies the assumption of abnormal risk. The purpose to be served in this case was the saving of life. The men were inclined(p) to take that risk.They were not, in my view, called on to take any risk other than that which normally might be encountered in this service. I agree with Barry J that, on the whole of the evidence which was given, it would not be right to find that the defendants as employers were guilty of any failure of the duty which they owed to their workmen. In my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed. DENNING LJ It is well settled that in measuring due care one must balance the risk against the measures necessary to eliminate the risk. To that proposition there ought to be added this.One must balance the risk against the end to be achieved. If this accident had occurred in a commercial enterprise without any emergency, there could be no d oubt that the servant would succeed. But the commercial end to make profit is very antithetical from the human end to save life or limb. The saving of life or limb justifies taking considerable risk, and I am glad to say there have never been wanting in this country men of courage ready to take those risks, notably in the fire service. In this case the risk involve in sending out the lorry was not so great as to prohibit the attempt to save life.I quite agree that fire engines, ambulances and doctors cars should not shoot past the traffic lights when they show a red light. That is because the risk is too great to warrant the incurring of the danger. It is always a question of balancing the risk against the end. I agree with my Lord that this appeal should be dismissed. MORRIS LJ I also agree. The accident in this case came about as a result of a around unusual concatenation of circumstances. There had for a long time been no call for the use of the jack.Any such call, according t o the evidence, was extremely rare. It so happened that a call came at a time when the Austin vehicle which would normally have carried the jack was otherwise engaged. I do not think it can be said to have been unreasonable to have had the Austin vehicle for use in the way that was arranged. Had the fire station been larger, had there been outright resources, unlimited space, and an unlimited number of vehicles, then it may be that another fitted vehicle would have been available. But that was not reasonably practicable or possible.When the call for the jack came, Mr Richards had to decide what to do, and I do not think that it would have been in accordance with the traditions of the fire service if he had said that he could do nothing other than call on St Albans. What he persistent to do was in accordance with the practice of the fire service. Mr Bottin, the assistant chief officer in the London Fire Brigade, verbalise of the provision of jacks, pointed out that in London there are twenty-nine sets of lifting gear, one being provided for every two stations. He said in evidence Q. back end you always undertake that that one vehicle will be available for the transport of a jack? A. No. Q. In your view is it reasonably practicable for a fire service to adapt all of its vehicles for the transport of jacks? A. No. I would not think it was reasonable. Q. You have been a station officer, have you not? A. I have. Q. Supposing you found yourself in charge of a station, and supposing the equipment available was not that most suitable for the purpose but you found that human life was in danger and you might save it by adopting a method not entirely suitable, what in your view would be your duty as a station officer?A. I have had that experience, and I did not hesitate to get the equipment there as quickly as possible. As I have said, I think Mr Richards acted in accordance with the traditions of the service, and I cannot for one moment think that the employ ers could be held responsible as having failed in the performance of their duties. I agree that the appeal fails. 43. Rogers v Whitaker (p189) 44. Barnett v Chelsea Hospital 45. March v E. &038 M. H Stramare Pty. Ltd.